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Abstract
This paper presents a model of collusive bargaining networks. Given a status quo network,
game is played in two stages: in the rst stage, pairs of sellers form the network by signing
two-sided contracts that allow sellers to use connections of other sellers; in the second stage,
sellers and buyers bargain for the product. We extend the notion of a pairwise Nash stability
with transfers to pairwise Nash stability with contracts and characterize the subgame perfect
equilibria. The equilibrium rents are determined for all rms based on their collateral and
bargaining power. When a stable equilibrium exists, sharing always generates maximum
social welfare and eliminates the frictions created by the network structure. The equilibria
depend on the initial network setup, likewise bargaining and contractual procedures. In
the homogeneous case, equilibria exist when the number of buyers and sellers are relatively
unequal. When the number of buyers exceeds number of sellers, bargaining privileges of
sellers over buyers and a low sharing transfer are required for the equilibrium to exist. In the
networks with relatively few monopolized sellers, sharing leads to a complete reallocation
of surplus to sellers and a zero sharing transfer. When the global market is dominated by
sellers, surplus is divided relatively equitably. It is also shown that in the special case of the
model with only one monopolistic seller and no market entry, the sharing process organizes
sellers in the supply chain order.
JEL: L11, L140, L120
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Motivation

The network structure of trading markets has long been recognized in the literature (see Demange
and Wooders (2005) and Easley and Kleinberg (2010) for the extensive reviews). It is commonly
assumed that network links represent business connections between sellers and buyers, while
nodes represent traders. The structure of the network has a strong eect on the equilibrium
volume and prices. Networks restrict traders to only local operation and create matching frictions
for buyers and sellers. Dense networks provide more opportunities for traders to alternate, and
comparing to sparse networks, are characterized by a higher market trade volume.3
If the goal of one is to increase system eciency and number of matched traders, it can be
realized by building new connections between traders. Link creation can be processed in dierent
ways with various economical costs. Two main approaches have been used in theoretical modeling of markets on graphs: centralized approach based on matching mechanism and decentralized
(game theoretical) approach. When allocation of goods is controlled by the centralized matching mechanism (discussed in Myerson (1977)), adding links between sellers and buyers always
increases total market surplus (also see Guzman (2011) ). So if link formation induces low cost,
the network architecture may increase network connectivity to raise eciency. In reality, most
markets are not controlled by a single network architecture and instead operate according to the
law of supply and demand. Thus the network that results from interactions between traders may
not be optimal. A network formation process is often the result of actions of market traders,
so the link formation may be avoided strategically. The game theoretical literature showed that
stability and eciency are not equivalent for a wide range of network formation games (Jackson
and Wolinsky (1996)). It implies that for the decentralized markets, strategic behavior of agents
is the key determinant of the equilibrium outcome.
We follow the strategic approach and postulate that networks, as well as prices and quantities,
are determined by the trader's individual incentives. The network formation game allows to see
explicitly the role of preliminaries, such as network formation rules and initial network structure,
for the emerging equilibria, which can potentially provide an explanation for the implicit network
formation process observed by the empirical literature.
Employment search is one of the applications of heterogeneous sharing game with indivisible
good: current employees freely (sometimes privately or publicly) share information about the
open positions with job seekers. The referral process among job seekers helps to reduce search
cost and increases the total employment. Likewise employment agencies do job matching professionally and charge a fee for their services. For example, an online job agency may be recruiting
a manager at the same time as nding another manager for the client.
With a recent development of online business infrastructure, the question of information
sharing has become extremelly important. It is especially the case for the online trading. Internet
makes it possible for rms to cooperate freely. However, the costs of consumer search create a
network structure based on the popularity of websites, which makes it dicult for new internet
projects to become popularized among consumers. When rms exchange information about the
demand side, they expand their business and decrease buyer's search costs. Internet giants, as
well as small companies, are collecting information about the preferences of consumers and sell
it to either competitors or rms in other markets. For example, the Facebook is using an ads
manager located on the side of the webpage as a mechanism of access sharing.
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The result holds for bilateral bargaining models with complete information, because, ceteris paribus, the size
of a maximal matching stays the same or increases when one more link is added to the network.
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The mechanism of link sharing may be also applied to such matching problems as allocation
of doctors to hospitals or graduates to universities. Though a separate model needs to be
developed for the sharing matching, we hypothesize that if low ranked universities were allowed
to sell information to the high ranked universities, the market eciency could be increased.
Finally, the sharing network model provides a theoretical explanation for an industry formation, including formation of intermediaries.4 It is a fact that the strongest market players often
expand by creating a business network (based on franchising or resellers). At the same time,
some rms completely specialize on reselling and information sharing. The sharing model goes
along with this stylized facts; it also explains why intermediaries do not explode all benets from
connecting sellers.
In this paper, the network formation process results from the cooperative behavior of sellers,
which collude in a very specic way: preliminary to the bargaining stage, they share access to
buyers with each other. Initially, sellers and buyers are connected via links of a bipartite status
quo network G0 . The opportunity to change the network is given to sellers.5 That is a reasonable
assumption for the bargaining markets, because most buyers operate on multiple markets with
dierent products and due to a time constraint and lack of incentives deal only with the rms
they know, whereas sellers (rms) invest tons of resources in marketing campaigns and market
expansions.6
The process of link sharing is similar to selling information about buyer's preferences and
locations. In a sense, link sharing model is an expansion of a simple oligopoly model with the
multiple small markets operating side by side. In this paper, the model of the sharing network
formation is interpreted as a model of legal collusion between rms against consumers. Nowadays,
information is widely traded and does not have any restrictions on the seller's location: contact
information and market role of most of the sellers can be found using online resources. So any
seller may buy an access from any other seller using an internet platform. This allows sharing
process to be nonrestrictive and competitive. Due to a nature of information as a non rival
benet of a network sharing process (Bala and Goyal (2000)), it is also assumed that once
information is shared, it cannot be forgotten by the sellers. Interesting that a new link formation
does not always result in trade between newly matched agents, but always provides an additional
bargaining power to both traders. The process of this specic network formation may be applied
to very dierent markets.
The equilibrium concept being used is an extension of a pairwise stable equilibrium with
transfers introduced by Bloch and Jackson (2007) . Contracts instead of transfers are considered
in the network formation process, and the model is applied to multiple stages. We require actions
to be pairwise stable in each subgame, which means that no more than two sellers may deviate
as a coalition. Additional to pairwise stability of transfers, transfers are also required to be Nash
stable (similar to Gilles and Sarangi (2004) ). It allows rms to breach or reconsider old contracts
when they involve into a new contract. Given the optimal strategies in each bargaining subgame,
the equilibrium strategies in the entire game may be determined using a backward induction.
We focus on the link sharing process. Several papers (including Jackson Wolinsky (1996)) have
4
The model is more relevant to the formation of distributors rather than wholeseller, since the rst ones are
rarely sell the goods directly and deal mostly with the information services.
5
Following the classical approach, a link can be formed bilaterally by a pair seller-buyer. On the contrary,
this paper does not require buyer's consent for a link formation; the link can be formed only with an accord of
another seller who already has an access to the buyer.
6
Model may be easily changed to the one with buyers forming links.
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used transfers to solve the ineciency problem, but their market mechanisms were not enough
to overcome network barriers. It will be shown that together with the link sharing, transfers
among sellers can be a mechanism to increase total eciency.
When the equilibrium of the sharing network formation game exists, network formation always generates market eciency and maximum social surplus. It means that ineciency created
by the network structure can be eliminated and Walrasian allocation can be achieved. The
emerged equilibria depend on the initial network setup, contract terms (transfers and remedies
for breach) and bargaining market power of sellers relative to buyers (z ∈ [0, 1]). The homogeneous and heterogeneous networks are considered separately. In the homogeneous case, the
equilibrium exists when the number of buyers exceeds suciently the number of sellers, or when it
is less than the number of sellers; however, when the market sides are relatively equally weighted,
no equilibrium exists.
Two dierent types of equilibria emerge. In the rst type of equilibrium, maximum market
surplus is completely reallocated to sellers and the price of sharing among sellers is zero. The
second type of equilibrium is more favored by buyers, since total surplus is moderately divided
between buyers and sellers according to their bargaining power. However, besides the shortage
of buyers, another necessary condition should be satised to guarantee existence: sellers are
required to sign the contracts with the high net sharing transfer7 , and the higher the bargaining
power of sellers, the lower the minimum sharing transfer requirement. This requirements also
implies that sellers have more bargaining power than buyers.
It is also proved that in the special case with only one monopolistic seller and no market
entrants, the sharing process organizes sellers in the supply chain order with some sellers being
resellers and others being retailers. Multiple equilibria are possible in this situation. Sellers may
share access for free, or for a non-negative transfer which depends on the individual fnet transfer.
The latter case is possible when buyers have more bargaining power than sellers. Then retailers
that master a high xed cost level, get access for free, while other retailers pay transfer between
zero and buyer bargaining share 1 − z . Resellers get zero prot with net transfer exceeding their
xed cost level but being less than the buyer bargaining share.
In the heterogeneous case, every sharing equilibrium is also ecient. It means that costs
created by market network structure can be completely eliminated by implementing sharing
mechanism. However, similar to the homogeneous case, the surplus may be divided unevenly
between selling and buying sides.
The paper has the following structure: part II with the literature review follows the introduction part, then part III formally denes the set of feasible networks and rules of the game,
solution of the model for dierent status quo networks G is given in part IV, and nally conclusion
summarizes the paper.

2

Literature review

This paper contributes primarily to the literature on network formation games with the application to bargaining markets. The theoretical approach to network formation is based on Bloch
7

As a result of the network formation process, sellers may become intermediaries and the total transfer for link
sharing may be formed collectively by multiple sellers. The deviation of few sellers may result in the insolvency
of the intermediary. That is why the pairwise contract is contingent on the behavior of other players. Here, the
condition is on the net transfer from e seller to another seller.
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and Jackson (2007) . They provide an extension to a standard network formation process adding
monetary transfers from one agent to another. In this paper, the model is further extended to
the network formation with contracts. It is then applied to multiple stages of the game. The
notion of stability in the network formation games was rst fundamentally discussed in Jackson
and Wolinsky (1996) and then extended by many researchers (see Bloch and Jackson (2006) for
the review of equilibrium concepts and Dutta and Bloch (2011) for the recent review of network
formation games), we use these concepts to characterize the equilibrium set. The supernetwork
approach described in Page and Wooders (2007, 2009) is being used to nd the stable sets in
the network formation game. This approach is based on eliminating networks with pairwise deviations benecial to both agents; it guarantees that survived networks (called path dominance
core) are pairwise stable for the predetermined game specications.
The homogeneous case of the sharing networks is basically the extension of the model of
Corominas-Bosch (2004) . Particularly, the network decomposition mechanism is used to represent network as a composition of subnetworks of three dierent types. Corominas-Bosch (2004)
characterizes each market with the network decomposition and bargaining power z ∈ [0, 1], the
coecient that shows what equilibrium is likely to emerge in the standard Nash bargaining game
when a continuum of prices are stable. In that work, the coecient is linked to a time discount
factor. In the setup of sharing networks, parameter z has a signicant eect on the existence and
stability of equilibria. The work of Elliot (2013) combines approaches from Corominas-Bosch
(2004) and a paper of Kranton and Minehart (2000) to show that in case of heterogeneous traders
the bargaining solution can also be characterized by a single parameter z ∈ [0, 1]. This result
indicates that sharing model can be easily extended to a heterogeneous case.
The specics of each model in the literature on bargaining networks include a bargaining
mechanism. Several papers propose dierent bargaining protocols including Bertrand competition (Lever (2009) ), Cournot competition (Goyal and Joshi (2006) ), ascending-bid auction
(Kranton and Minehart (2000) ), alternating-oer bargaining (Corominas-Bosch (2004) ), bilateral negotiations similar to Rubinstein-Wolinsky mechanism (198) (Polanski (2007) , Kearns
(2007)). In this paper, it is assumed that seller-seller and buyer-seller bargaining happen in
the way similar to Bloch and Jackson (2007): both traders propose the amount that will be
transferred to another trader for a good or for an access. If the sum of transfers exceeds zero,
contract is signed. This protocol does not add additional time frictions like in the models with
sequential trading. To form a particular belief system, we select an equilibrium in each subgame
that guarantees pairwise stability and in the consistency of beliefs among traders.8
Manea (2011) builds an innite horizon model of a bargaining game. In his paper, matched
pairs that reach agreement are replaced by new traders keeping the network structure the same.
Similar to this model, given the network, bargaining outcome is dependent on the bargaining
power between two agents. Dierent from this paper, the traders cannot change the network
and are restricted to trade with only connected traders.
The idea of contingent contract in the bargaining networks is also captured by Mauleon
(2011) . The authors are using linear and two-part taris to research stability and eciency in
the networks of manufacturers and retailers; it is shown that the former does not guarantee the
later for these types of contracts..
8

Some papers focus on the bargaining process with a sequence of proposals following some exogenously determined order (see for example Currarini and Morelli (2003) ). The sequential approach has its advantages,
such as uniqueness of equilibrium, as well as disadvantages, including the strong dependence of equilibria on the
exogenously determined mechanism.
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The paper is also related to the literature on resellers and changing market structure on
a network. There is a paper of Blume et al (2008) that considers a bargaining network with
intermediaries. The intuition of this paper is similar to this model; however there are few
dierences, including that in the sharing network formation sellers can choose between being an
intermediary or not being an intermediary. Besides in the sharing game, the intermediary's fee
is endogenously determined. Belleamme and Bloch (2004) also explore oligopoly markets on
networks with sharing agreements by which rms commit not to enter each other's territory.
Finally, the process of sharing is similar to the seller referral process, which happens when
a match is created between a seller and a buyer by anothe agent. With the development of
information markets, referral business model becomes more popular among intermediaries and
rms. Likewise, Galeotti (2013) showed that the referral business scheme is preferred by an
intermediary to the process of buying and reselling the object. This process helps sellers to avoid
search costs, while at the same time it may increase prices due to the collusive nature of the
process. Arbatskaya and Konishi (2012) provide the conditions when the referral is benecial
for both sellers and buyers in the non-network setup. We consider the referral process in the
markets with a network structure and allow any seller to provide a referral.

3

Model setup

3.1 Structure of the game
In this section, a link sharing game is strictly dened. Bargaining is realized at time t=2, while
at time t=1 sellers are allowed to increase connectivity of a network by sharing access to their
buyers with other sellers. Sharing increases seller's bargaining power and expands the local
markets. The game has the following structure:

• Stage 0: Sellers and buyers are informed about the status quo network G0 and the parameters of the game.
• Stage 1: Each seller proposes sharing contracts to all other sellers, and in case of consistency
signs the agreements. Network G0 is formed.
• Stage 2: Given the network G0 , sellers and buyers bargain for the goods.
• Stage 3: The payos are distributed. If sellers are not able to pay the debt, they announce
bankruptcy and pay only the guaranteed transfer specied by the contract terms.
Each of the stages is examined in the following paragraphs in details.

3.2 Feasible sharing networks
The market is determined by sets of buyers and sellers and a set of business connections. A
buyer and a seller can bargain with each other only if they are connected. Each seller produces
one unit of good or nothing, and each buyer demands one unit of the good. For simplicity, the
good is assumed to be non-divisible and homogeneous across sellers. Agents gain no utility from
holding money. Seller's values (production costs) and buyer's values are exogenously given.9
9
When utility function is linear, assumption that the good is non-divisible is not crucial. When the individual
demand function is non-linear, the bargaining problem becomes more interesting. It can be shown that under the
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The network representation is useful to operate with the model. A set of nodes and corresponding traders is exogenously given

N = S ∪ B = (s1 , s2 , s3 , ..., sn , b1 , b2 , b3 , ..., bm ),
where S denotes a set of sellers and B denotes a set of buyers. Before network formation
game is started, each seller has access to a non-empty subset of buyers, and each buyer has access
to a non-empty subset of sellers.10 Sellers are connected to buyers via directed arcs.11 A set of
arc types is denoted as A j N . We say that an arbitrary seller s1 and buyer b1 can trade with
each other if and only if there is an arc from node s1 to node b1 .The initial market structure
can be represented by a bipartite graph G0 with sellers and buyers being nodes and business
connections being arcs. Once the sharing stage is complete, new connections are formed. The
arcs between sellers are formed in the sharing stage if they share access to one of the buyers. It
means that multiple arcs of dierent types can exist between two sellers if they decide to share
multiple buyers. The notation which is robust with respect to this modeling assumptions is the
one used by Page and Wooders (2007, 2009), which denes network as a subset of a Cartesian
product of a set of arc types A, and ordered pairs (N × N ).

Denition 1.

[Sharing network] Given a set of nodes N = S ∪ B , sharing network G0 is dened
as a non-empty closed subset of (A × (N × N ), where each element (a, (s, b)) ∈ (A × (N × N )
determines the connection of type a ∈ S from node s ∈ S to node b ∈ B , and each element
(a0 , (s, s0 )) ∈ (A × (N × N )) determines the connection of type a0 ∈ B from node s ∈ S to node
s0 ∈ S . Arcs from buyers to sellers are not allowed.
Also, a set of buyers connected to s1 in network G0 is denoted by N b (s1 , G0 ) and a set of
sellers buying access from s1 is denoted by N s (s1 , G0 ). Based on this notation we formally dene
feasible networks:

Denition 2.

hold:

[Feasible network] A sharing network G0 is feasible if the following conditions

• for any two sellers s1 ∈ S , s2 ∈ S , if (a, (s1 , s2 )) ∈ G0 , then a ∈ N b (s2 , G0 ) ∈ B ;
• for s1 6= s2 any connection (s2 , (s1 , b)) ∈ G0 if and only if (b, (s1 , s2 )) ∈ G0 ;
• if G0 is dierent from a status quo network G0 , then for any seller s1 ∈ S and buyer b ∈ B ,
connection (a, (s1 , b)) ∈ G0 preserves (a, (s1 , b)) ∈ G0 and a = s1 .
Given a status quo network G0 , a set of all feasible networks is denoted as F(G0 ).
The rst two conditions describe a double labeling procedure, which means that trade paths
of aliated nodes can be detected through the connections of sellers as well as connections of
buyers. The formation of a link between sellers always corresponds to a formation of a link
between one of the sellers and a buyer. Besides, according to the sharing rules, a seller may sell
large subset of cost functions, stable equilibrium in the bargaining game does not exist. Consequently, no sharing
equilibrium exists for these cases.
10
Since it is not possible to connect to isolated buyers via link sharing, we assume that they do not exist.
11
The term "arc" is used instead of "link" to emphasize that an access from a seller to a buyer can be provided
by dierent sellers and thus arcs may have dierent types.
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an access only if he is connected to the buyer himself. The arc from one seller to another seller
has type which is equivalent to the label of the shared buyer.
The third condition states that links cannot be sold ultimately. In other words, the number
of connections may only increase, which in general, may or may not lead to an increase in trade
volume.
Buying access to B2:
(B2, S1, S2)

Online
Store

Selling access to B2:
(B2, S1, S2)

S1

S2

B1

B2

Amazon.com

B3

Figure 1: Network G': sharing access to buyers with a small unpopular store.
An example of network formation via sharing is the formation of online resellers, the feasible
network is presented at Figure 1. The well-known online store Amazon is represented by node
s1 , while a small online store is represented by node s2 . The two companies compete in the
market of the same type of good (i.e. a cell phone12 ), but Amazon has incentives to provide a
selling platform for the online store s1 because of the large number of buyers that it has access
to. The small store pays fee t21,2 , which depends on the sales volume of the online store. Under
this rules, network G' is dened by
initial connections (s1 , (s1 , b1 )), (s2 , (s2 , b2 )), (s2 , (s2 , b3 )),
connections formed as a result of collusion (s2 , (s1 , b2 )), (b2 , (s1 , s2 )),
where the last two connections indicate that seller s2 gets an access to buyer b2 through seller
s1 . This notation allows us to claim that sellers may trade goods with buyers not only through
direct but also through indirect connections (if there is a path from a seller to a buyer).

3.3 The rst stage: network formation
In the rst stage of the game, sellers submit their bids similar to the model in Bloch and Jackson
(2007) 13 : arbitrary seller si announces a set of links that will be shared and the corresponding
sharing contract terms. Each contract, that si proposes, consists of the transfer function tki,j (·)
k (·), which is the transfer from
from seller si to seller sj and a guaranteed transfer function Bi,j
12
An unlocked phone HTC One 32GB Silver is sold by multiple online stores which are listed on Amazon.com,
including Amazon itself and at least 30 more sellers. The stores sell exactly the same good without accessorizes
and additional plan benets.
13
This paper considers contracts rather than simply prices, which means that sellers should agree on price and
default correspondences, which are contingent on the emerged network and trade volumes.
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seller si to seller sj when the buyer of the link is insolvent. Both functions are contingent on the
strategies of other players. Conclusively, seller s1 submits bids in the form
k
k
[(bk , (sj , si )), tki,j (·), Bi,j
(·), ] or [(bk , (si , sj )), tki,j (·), Bi,j
(·)],

where the rst triple (bk , (sj , si )) captures a connection that seller si is willing to sell, and the
second triple (bk , (si , sj )) is a connection that is being sold to si . Transfers may be positive as
well as non-positive depending on the selling side. Transfers without actually selling the access
are not allowed. 14
We dene a vector space Γi of functions from the set of networks of size n × m to the dual
space R2 . The variableΓi denotes the set of all possible contracts that can be proposed by seller
si . Then, in the rst stage of the game, the action space of seller si is a product of the valid arc
space and a corresponding contract: ((S × (S × B)) ∩ G0 ) × Γi . The sets of possible contracts
Γ1 , Γ2 , ..., Γn may be dierent across rms. For example, there may be a seller dierentiation
based on the maximum xed cost that a rm can pay.
k (·) depend on the strategies of all sellers and buyers and may have various
Functions tki,j (·), Bi,j
forms. For example, guaranteed transfer and transfer functions may be completely determined
by a prot level that one of the sellers has: the functions may be constant or linearly dependent
k = tk = 0
on the prot functions. The only requirements imposed on the contract terms are Bi,j
i,j
k ≤ tk unconditional on the game outcome.
for normal prots, and Bi,j
i,j
Connection (bk , (si , sj )) between arbitrary sellers si and sj is formed if and only if
k + Bk ≥ 0
tki,j + tkj,i ≥ 0 and Bi,j
j,i

for any strategies of other players. If the amount paid exceeds the amount requested, the
rest of money is wasted. However, it is clear that in the equilibrium money is never wasted.
To provide the intuitive association, we will refer to function tki,j (·) as a full transfer, and to
k (·) as a xed cost or collateral. Then amount tk − B k may be considered as a
a function Bi,j
i,j
i,j
variable cost paid by seller si to seller sj for the access to buyer bk .
For simplicity, we will denote the states, when the strategies of other players are such that
transfer tki,j can be paid in full, as Ω(si , sj ) = 1; otherwise, Ω(si , sj ) = 0 and only the xed cost
k will be paid.
Bi,j
The limited liability condition is also imposed on sellers, which means that the some of total
transfers they process is less than the prot that they get from selling or not selling the good.

3.4 The second stage: game on a network
Once network G0 is formed in the rst stage, sellers bargain with buyers via Nash bargaining
mechanism: sellers and buyers submit their bids, and if the sum of bids exceeds zero, they trade.
We require equilibrium prices to be pairwise stable, which means that any seller and buyer
cannot be better o by breaking the agreements or signing an alternative agreement with other
traders. Suppose prices are proposed by buyers and sellers simultaneously, exactly like transfers
in the rst stage of the game, then any allocation of goods is pairwise stable if the oer, that
is accepted, provides a higher utility level than the second best oers made to them. Based on
14

A game with transfers unsupported by the link sharing may be considered as a collusion. Instead, in this
paper, we consider only a legal form of cooperation.
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this bargaining rule, multiple equilibria may arise: arbitrary chosen seller s1 and buyer b2 have
no incentives to deviate from any price p(s1 , b2 ) that exceeds the maximum price that can be
oered by buyers N b (s1, G0 ) and is inferior to the minimum price oered by sellers N s (b2 , G0 ). To
guarantee the uniqueness and validity of beliefs in the multiple stage game, we say that among
all equilibrium prices [p12 , p12 ] dened by the disagreement point, the equilibrium that emerges
is p(s1 , b2 ) = (1 − z)p12 + zp12 . This equilibrium selection is consistent with the Rubinstein
bargaining mechanism, when traders make alternative oers next period if they disagree on the
price, and parameter z ∈ [0, 1] is determined by the time discount factor. For the egalitarian
rule, z would be equal0.5. Parameter z also characterizes the bargaining power that sellers have
relative to buyers. The same approach to equilibrium selection is used in Elliott (2012) and
Corominas-Bosch (2003).
The multiplicity of equilibria under this selective procedure is still possible when, for example,
two buyers with the same values compete for the good. However, independent on the allocation
of the good, buyers will get zero utility. It happens because the utility from not having the
good is assumed to be zero, while utility from paying the maximum value as a price also delivers
utility of zero.

3.5 Payos.
b }
Suppose that G0 is an equilibrium network formed in the rst stage of the game, while {tbi,k , Bi,k
i,k,b
and {p(si , bk )}i,k are the sets of equilibrium transfers and prices. Without loss of generality, the
nal payo that players si and bj get is the dierence between the value and the sum of transfers
and prices that they pay:
X
X
Vsi (t, p) = −v(si ) −
p(si , bk ) −
(1)
tbi,k I(Ω(si , sk ) = 1) −
s,bk :(s,(si ,bk ))∈G0

−

b,sk :(b,(si ,sk ))∈G0

P

b,sk :(b,(si ,sk ))∈G0

b I(Ω(s , s ) = 0)
Bi,k
i k

X

Vbj (t, p) = v(bj ) −

s,sk :(s,(sk ,bj

p(bj , sk ),

(2)

))∈G0

where I(·) is an indicator function.
If the insolvency of the seller happens, it leads to a default and only an amount of xed
cost is paid to creditors. The bankruptcy of a seller is announced when he is unable to pay the
creditors back given the equilibrium prices:
b
b,sk :(b,(si ,sk ))∈G0 ti,k

P

+ v(si ) +

P

s,bk :(s,(si ,bk ))∈G0

p(si , bk ) ≥ 0.

The set of xed costs should be lower enough, such that the following inequality is satised
given the variation in the strategies of other sellers:

P

b,sk :(b,(si ,sk ))∈G00

b + v(s ) +
Bi,k
i

P

s,bk :(s,(si ,bk ))∈G00

p(si , bk ) ≤ 0.

We assume that the set of valid contract is restricted to the contracts satisfying the inequality
above.
10

3.6 Equilibrium renement
The appropriate concept of equilibrium for the dynamic game is a subgame perfect equilibrium,
which eliminates an obligation for the selling party to avoid trade with the shared buyer. In
other words, an agreement between two sellers may not enforce one of them to sell the link, the
contract may only provide access to a seller using the connections of another seller. This situation
is possible when links are rival but non-excusable. One of the examples of this situation is when
links in a bargaining network formation game are used to model the acquaintances or business
connections on the markets with high search costs. Another example is when buyers have binary
preferences for some particular technology or brand and existence of a link is equivalent to a
patent or a presence of some essential brand characteristics. To emphasize that the contracts are
not restrictive for the selling side, we use the terminology "sharing a link" instead of "selling a
link".

3.6.1 Pairwise stable equilibrium in the bargaining subgame
First the bargaining game on the network is considered. The pairwise stable equilibrium in the
subgame is dened in the following way:

Denition 3.

[Pairwise stable equilibrium in the bargaining subgame] Externally given set of
transfers t = (t1 , t2 , ..., tn ), guaranteed transfers B = (B1 , B2 , ..., Bn )15 , and a status quo network
G0 are sucient to dene emerged network G0 ∈ F(G0 ). In a corresponding bargaining subgame,
a set of strategies

psi : (S × (si × N b (si , G0 ))) → <

pbj : (S × (N s (bj , G0 ) × bj )) → <
and payos dened in (1), (2) constitute a pairwise stable Nash equilibrium (PSNE) if each
trader is worse o by not trading and there does not exist a pair of players (si , bj ) and corresponding actions poi,. , poj,. such that

Vsi (t, ps1 , ..., posi , ..., psn , pb1 , ..., pobj , ..., pbm ) ≥ Vsi (t, ps1 , ..., psi , ..., psn , pb1 , ..., pbj , ..., pbm )
Vbj (t, ps1 , ..., posi , ..., psn , pb1 , ..., pobj , ..., pbm ) ≥ Vbj (t, ps1 , ..., psi , ..., psn , pb1 , ..., pbj , ..., pbm )
and one of the inequalities is strict.
The main dierence from the denition of Bloch and Jackson (2007) is the ability of two
sellers to change all their bids simultaneously. The concept of pairwise equilibrium in Bloch and
Jackson (2007) assumes that a player may deviate by changing the bids or by changing only one
bid. However, if according to the rules of the game only one active connection is possible, it is
reasonable to assume that simultaneously by signing a new trade agreement with bj , seller si may
want to break down the agreement with the previous business partner bi . The pairwise Nash
stability is a natural extension of the strong stability concept, described in Gilles and Sarangi
(2004), extended on the network formation with transfers.
15

For simplicity, ti denotes the set of transfers between seller si and other sellers.

11

3.6.2 Subgame perfect equilibria with pairwise stable Nash agreements
Similar to the equilibrium concept used in the subgames, we dene the feasible equilibrium
concept for the whole game:

Denition 4.

[Subgame perfect equilibrium with pairwise stable Nash agreements (SPPSNE)]
Externally given a status quo network G0 , the set of contracts (t = (t1 , t2 , ..., tn ),B = (B1 , B2 , ..., Bn )),
0
0
0
0
0
0
trade agreements and a vector of prices Pf (t1 , B1 ..., ti , Bi ..., tj , Bj ...) dened for all possible con0
0
0
0
0
0
tracts (t1 , B1 ..., ti , Bi ..., tj , Bj ...) form a subgame perfect equilibrium with pairwise stable Nash
agreements if
i) prices form a pairwise stable Nash equilibrium in each subgame;
ii) transfers form a pairwise stable Nash equilibrium in the network formation game played at
t = 1, which means that sellers benet from sharing and there does not exist a pair of players
0 ) = (−t0 , −B 0 ) such that
(si , sj ) and corresponding contracts ((t0i , Bi0 ), (t0j , Bj0 )) with (t0i,j , Bi,j
j,i
j,i

Vsi (t1 , B1 ..., t0i , Bi0 ..., t0j , Bj0 ..., Pf ) ≥ Vsi (t1 , ..., ti , Bi ..., tj , Bj ...., Pf )

Vsj (t1 , ..., t0i , Bi0 ..., t0j , Bj0 ...., Pf ) ≥ Vsj (t1 , ..., ti , Bi ..., tj , Bj ..., Pf )
and one of the inequalities is strict.

3.6.3 Equilibrium existence
The existence of the pairwise equilibria is not guaranteed. From the previous literature, it is
known that network formation game with transfers does not always sustain an equilibrium.
Besides, the sharing game cannot be characterized as a game with non-positive or nonnegative externalities, so the specic results of Bloch and Jakson (2007) cannot be applied.
Finally, the game does not have a potential function, which eliminates the possibility of
solving the model using maximum optimization techniques. So existence cannot be proved by
some general results and should be examined specically for this model.

4

Homogeneous sharing networks

In this part of the paper, the production costs are assumed to be homogeneous and equal zero.
Homogenous buyers are willing to pay no more than one unit of currency for the good. The
homogeneous assumption helps to observe the status quo network eect on the nal outcome.
The heterogeneous case will be considered in the next section of the paper.

4.1 Network decomposition in the homogeneous bargaining game
From the paper of Corominas-Bosch (2004) it follows that any bipartite network can be decomposed into the subnetworks of three dierent types: Gs , Gb , Ge . Subnetwork of a network G is
called of type Gs (G) if there are more sellers than buyers in this network and all buyers can be
matched with sellers in this subnetwork. Subnetwork of a network G is called of type Gb (G) if
there are more buyers than sellers in this network and all sellers can be matched with buyers in
this subnetwork. A subnetwork is called of type Ge (G) if there is equal number of sellers and
12

buyers and all of them can be matched. The condition on the maximum bipartite matching in
a subnetwork is equivalent to the Hall's criteria.

Conjecture. (Hall's criteria)
• For the set of n sellers S and m buyers B connected via a subnetwork of type Gb (G)
(or Ge (G)) with n ≤ m, there exist a matching saturating the set of sellers if and only
if any subset W of sellers of size k < n is connected to more than k buyers: |W | ≤
|N b (W, G)|, ∀W ⊂ S .
• For the set of n sellers S and m buyers B connected via a subnetwork of type Gs (G)
(or Ge (G)) with n ≥ m, there exist a matching saturating the set of buyers if and only
if any subset W of buyers of size k < m is connected to more than k buyers: |W | ≤
|N s (W, G)|, ∀W ⊂ B .
It is known that the stable outcome in the homogeneous bargaining game always corresponds
to the maximum matching in a given network. From the decomposition it follows that without sharing, the stable outcome is such that sellers and buyers in Gs (G0 ) get zero and one
correspondingly, while sellers and buyers in Gb (G0 ) get one and zero correspondingly.16
Notice that the payos of agents are independent of the volume of trade. Indeed the multiplicity of equilibria exists when an agent is indierent between multiple trade agreements or
between zero prot and non-trading. Nevertheless, independent of the equilibrium selection, the
agents with no bargaining power always get no benets from trade (their payo is zero). The
split of trade surplus between a buyer and a seller in Ge (G0 ) is pairwise stable if it provides
traders with the payo higher than the second best oer. In the homogeneous case, it can be
shown that pairwise stable prices in Ge (G0 ) with the equilibrium selection proposed above are
always z ∈ [0; 1].
The example of a status quo network G0 is provided on Figure 2, the unique decomposition
is also shown as clouds of types Gb , Gs and Ge . The possible trade agreements are indicated
by red fat lines. There are multiple equilibria that satisfy pairwise stability in G0 : seller s1 is
always indierent between trading with b1 or b2 , as well as b5 is indierent between trading with
s4 and s5 . However, the benets from trade are the same for all equilibria (see numbers next to
the nodes). We may observe that connectivity in the network is insucient for the sellers in Ge
and Gs to extract full benets of trade. If s6 shares market with s5 , the new network G0 can be
formed. In the bargaining game played on G0 , sellers increase their payos relative to the ones
on network G. Again, the matching is not unique, but the payos are unique. It is also clear,
that the maximum volume of trade is achieved when the link is added.
From this example, the benets of adding links becomes clear; however, under the strategic
link formation, network G0 is not stable. To nd the stable sets, we consider the special and the
more general cases in the subsections that follow.

4.2 Networks consisting of subnetworks of types Gs and Ge
The interpretation for the model of homogeneous networks can be easily provided: sellers of type
Gb (G0 ) represent well-established rms with good reputation, sellers of type Ge represent small
16

The proof of this fact is given in Corominas- Bosch (2004). This result was also veried in the lab experiment
conducted by Charness, Corominas-Bosch, and Frechette (2007)
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Figure 2: Network decomposition of status quo network G0 .
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Figure 3: Network decomposition of network G0 .
rms that earn enough prot to survive on the market, but do not have enough bargaining power
to charge maximum prices, nally sellers of type Gs are new entrants. All rms have the same
production costs, but dierent reputation and dierent prevalence on the market. It is often
the case that size of production is limited from above and direct market expansion is costly, so
well-established rms prefer franchising as a form of market expansion. Under this explanation,
we interpret seller-buyer arcs as brand loyalty, and seller-seller arcs as franchising contracts. This
example or other applications discussed in the introduction, have a special case when a status
quo network has only sellers of types Gb and Ge . For the franchising model, network formation
may be considered as converting existing sellers into the franchising agents, which leads to a
monopolization of the market. The more specic model is a model of business expansion for one
particular rm. The equilibrium prices and contract terms for these specications are described
below.
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4.2.1 Link sharing between one seller of type Gb (G0 ) and multiple sellers of type
Ge (G0 ): franchising as a form of market expansion
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b
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Figure 4: Example: s2 buys access to b2 to increase his bargaining power.
It is easy to understand the model using the example with one seller s1 ∈ Gb (G0 ) and two sellers
s2 , s3 ∈ Ge (G0 ) (see Figure 4). Seller s1 attracts sucient number of sellers, while sellers s2
and s3 face a tough competition. If s2 decides to join the franchise business network of s1 , he
gains the loyalty of new buyers, while seller s3 benets from the decrease in competition. One
of the equilibria is when sellers share access with each other for free. Sellers s2 and s3 have no
incentives to increase the price, while seller s1 cannot resell the access at a higher price once the
contract with s2 is signed. So there is no Nash or pairwise deviations that increase the welfare
of sellers.
There is another set of equilibria that are not trivial. When one of the sellers in Ge makes
a positive transfer to s1 (suppose it is seller s2 ), another seller's best response is to free ride. To
price the access, we recover that the benet that seller s2 gets is 1 − z , while s1 is not aected
by this network formation. The sellers have no incentives to breach if and only if t2,1 ∈ [0, 1 − z].
In addition, the amount of guaranteed transfer is not important in this case, as soon as
t2,1 ≥ B2,1 , because the emerged network is of type Gb (G) and the sellers always extract all
endowment from the buyers. Seller s1 has no incentives to underprice seller s2 , because of
limited production and availability of idle buyers.
In summary, the second type of equilibria agreements is the following: s1 provides seller s2 (or
s3 ) with access to one of the buyers for the transfer t2,1 ∈ [0, 1 − z], while seller s3 (s2 ) free rides.
Sellers gain full bargaining power in the market and buyers pay full price for the good.
A more general result is given for the case when seller s1 may expand to several locations:

Proposition 1. In a network with one seller dominating the local market (s1 of type Gb (G0 )),
and other sellers facing moderate competition (s2 , s3 , ..., sN of type Ge (G0 )), there are two sets
of pairwise stable equilibria:
(1) Seller s1 of type Gb shares access with some sellers free of cost, other sellers freely get
access from those who already gained it. Multiple or zero intermediaries may be created.
(2) A tree of intermediaries is created, such that there are no two sellers in the tree from the
same sub-network of G0 and each non-terminal seller of the tree is transferring a non-negative
amount to the seller above in the hierarchy. Being a member of the tree, each seller transfers at
least the amount that was transferred to him.
Contracts with only low guaranteed transfers are possible Bk ≤ 1 − z . Sellers contribute
contribute a non-negative amount to the nal transfer: an arbitrary terminal seller sk in the
15
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Figure 5: The equilibrium network in the franchising sharing game

tree transfers
amount ∆tk = tk,k−1 ∈ [0, 1 − z], while every next seller sl contributes ∆tl =
P
tl,l−1 − i ti,l ∈ [Bl , 1 − z] to the amount that was transferred to him and processes it forward.
When sellers have more bargaining power than buyers (z ≥ 21 ), only equilibrium of type 1
exists. When buyers have more bargaining power, both types of equilibria are possible.
Proof. See Appendix.
Notice that intermediaries in the tree do not get direct prot from reselling, and do not benet
from their position in the tree. Only the last seller sN in the chain has the privilege because he
has no restrictions on the transfer from below. In this set of equilibria, all sub-networks of type
Ge upgrade to Gb and sellers gain full bargaining power. The condition for the net transfers to
be above the guaranteed transfer may be interpreted as the condition for the intermediary to
contribute a signicant portion in the total stream of transfers, so that other rms support the
sustainability of the intermediary. Intermediaries with the small monetary inow or with a large
xed cost Bk , will contribute low risk to the system and nally will be held up by one of the
sellers in the chain.
The part of the equilibrium network is presented at Figure 5. Suppose sellers that are
connected to s1 are brand sensitive and travel to the specialized store, while others are not brand
sensitive and buy goods from the stores which are close to them. Sellers s2 ,s3 ,.... experience
tough competition, because many local consumers switched to bargaining with seller s1 . Seller
s1 can eciently produce only one unit of good, that is why he has incentives to form a tree of
intermediaries. In the equilibrium, the franchising network will include only few representatives
on each local market. The intuition behind this fact is that costly franchise license is not
needed when the competitiveness of the local market becomes low enough. The contributions
of the intermediaries are non-negative and depend on the guaranteed transfer Bi . Firms that
can guarantee a larger part of the transfer in case of emergency, get access for free. Thus the
stability of an intermediary is as important as the transfer that it pays.

4.2.2 Multiple sellers of type Gb
When there are multiple sellers of type Gb , any equilibrium with positive transfers has a protable
deviation: since randomply chosen sellers s1a , s1b ∈ 0 bear no cost of sharing a link, they will
always underbid each other, unless transfer is zero. We also conclude that under zero transfers,
sharing network may have any structure.
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4.3 Networks consisting of subnetworks of types
with new entrants

Gs , Gb Ge :

large markets

We consider a network with three dierent subnetwork types. Sellers of type Gs may be interpreted as new entrants, because initially they either trade at a zero price or do not trade at all.
We also assume that there is more than one network of each type. Then the equilibrium outcome
can be determined based on the initial network structure.

Proposition 2. If

the excess of buyers in the market is greater than number of monopolized
sellers in the market N b (G0 , G0 ) − N s (G0 , G0 ) > N s (Gb , G0 ), then there exist a pairwise stable

equilibrium when monopolized sellers freely share access with other sellers and stop sharing when
they have at least one non-trading buyer in the local market. All sellers extract full bargaining
benets. Full eciency is achieved with the complete redistribution of wealth to the seller's side.
Proof. See Appendix.
The proposition above states that when there are suciently few new entrants, a pairwise
stable equilibrium exists. Besides, the price of sharing is zero at any state of the game. The
following theorem states that when there are more sellers than buyers, the set of equilibria is
suciently larger and includes equilibria with non-zero transfers.

Proposition 3. If the number of buyers is at most equal to the number of sellers N b (G0 , G0 ) ≤
N s (G0 , G0 ), then there exist a pairwise stable equilibria when monopolized sellers share access
with other non-trading sellers for transfers |ti,j | ∈ [1−z −B(ti,j ), z] and {Bi,j ≤ min(z, 2z −1)}i,j
for si ∈ Gb (G0 ) and sj ∈ Gs (G0 ). Sellers change their type to Ge if possible. Full eciency
is achieved and sellers and buyers share market surplus according to weights z and 1-z. When
number of buyers and sellers is equal, a transfer from si ∈ Gs (G0 ) to sj ∈ Gb (G0 ) equals
|ti,j | = 1 − z − Bi,j .
Proof. See Appendix.
It also becomes clear that markets with exceeding number of sellers do not require strong
government regulation because the surplus is divided relatively equitably. The employment
market, for instance, has exactly the structure described above.

Proposition 4. When 0 < N b (G0 , G0 ) − N s (G0 , G0 ) < N s (Gb , G0 ), pairwise stable equilibrium
does not exist.
Proof. The result of the theorem follows from the proofs of propositions 2 and 4.
Corollary 1. If a subgame perfect stable equilibrium exists in the sharing game, the emerged
network is Pareto ecient and the volume of trade is equivalent to the volume of trade in the
Walrasian equilibrium for the complete network.

5

Heterogeneous sharing networks

In this section, the assumption of traders being homogeneous among groups is relaxed. Sellers
as well as buyers may value good dierently. As we mentioned earlier, for the markets with
network structure, there is no unique price. Additionally, not every link between traders will
be actively used in bargaining, which is the case due to dierent bargaining positions of traders
and a property of indirect preferences having a bliss point. To describe the equilibrium in the
heterogeneous sharing game,we will need to distinguish between active and non-active arcs and
traders.
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Denition 5.

For a given equilibrium network G = (N × (A × A)), a group of active traders
NA (G) is dened as a set of nodes actively involved in bargaining. The rest of players can be
decomposed into the subsets NP (G) and NN (G), where NP (G) is formed by nodes being best
alternative oers for somebody, and NN (G) consists of non-trading players that have no eect
on the prices of others. Eventually, for any equilibrium network G, set of nodes can be presented
as a union of three subsets N = NA (G) ∪ NP (G) ∪ NN (G).

It is clear that for each equilibrium network, the node decomposition is unique. Based on
the node representation, the following proposition characterizes the equilibrium network.

Proposition 5. In the subgame perfect pairwise equilibrium, if an emerged network G' is decomposed into subnetworks NA = NA (G0 ), NP = NP (G0 ), and NN = NN (G0 ), the following
properties follow:
a) all non-trading buyers NN have lower values than passively trading buyers:
∀b1 ∈ NN ∩ B

and ∀b2 ∈ NP ∩ B it is always the case that v(b1 ) ≤ v(b2 );

b) actively trading buyers value good higher than passive buyers
∀b1 ∈ NP ∩ B

and ∀b2 ∈ NA ∩ B it is always the case that v(b1 ) ≤ v(b2 );

c) actively trading sellers produce at a lower cost than non-trading sellers
∀s1 ∈ NA ∩ S

and ∀s2 ∈ GP ∪ GN ∩ S it is always the case that v(s1 ) ≤ v(s2 );

Proof. See Appendix.
Similar to the homogeneous case we can prove that if a pairwise stable equilibrium exists, it
is ecient. Eciency is considered in terms of total market surplus, but the Pareto eciency
concept is equivalent to it in this model. We may use the simple demand and supply curves to
illustrate the Walrasian equilibrium.

Proposition 6. The network eect may be completely eliminated in the model with link sharing:
in the subgame perfect pairwise stable equilibrium, the total social surplus is equivalent to the
Walrasian total surplus. Besides, sellers and buyers trading in the network market are equivalent
to those trading in the market with complete network structure.
Proof.

bWe dene volume of trade Q

walr on

the intersection of demand and supply curves (see
Figure 6 for details). From the propositions above, it follows that the set of active traders is a
series of all agents from the left to some threshold Qtres . First, assume that Qtres < Qwalr . Then
it follows that there exists a seller s1 connected to some buyer b1 with v(s1 ) < v walr < v(b1 ).
If traders s1 and b1 are connected, they deviate from the equilibrium and trade, which leads
to contradiction. If the traders are not connected, since network has only one component in it,
buyer b1 is connected to some other seller s2 . Then the protable deviation for seller s2 always
exists. If the option to trade with b1 is not possible, seller s2 sells access to seller s1 do not involve
into bargaining with b1 . The existence of the pairwise deviation contradicts the assumption that
network that we consider is stable. It means that in the stable equilibrium, trade volume is at
least as low as in the Walrasian case.
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Figure 7: Example of a market with network structure.
In fact total surplus is Qwalr . The proof is that if there are two pairs with one seller and one
buyer being to the left side of Qwalr and other two traders being to the right side, seller with
the higher cost shares access to his buyer and do not bid any price. This collusion increases
pairwise surplus and leads to non-stability of equilibria. This thought example proves that
Qtres ≤ Qwalr .
The intuition behind the proof can be gained from the example presented on Figure 7.
Suppose, there are only two buyers and two sellers with the values shown at the Figure 8. If
network is complete, seller s2 trades with buyer b1 at price p2,1 = 6z + 3(1 − z) = 3 + 3z and
gains surplus 2 + 3z . Given network G0 : (s1, (s1 , b1 )), (s2, (s2 , b2 )), sellers and buyers x prices
p1,1 = 10z + 6(1 − z) = 6 + 4z and p2,2 = 3z + 1(1 − z) = 1 + 2z and together gain surplus 3z . If
seller s1 sells access to b1 and does not bid, the equilibrium price is p2,1 = 10z + 3(1 − z) = 3 + 7z
and seller's surplus is 2 + 7z . When the network contains one component, total market surplus
is 9, whereas when it contains two components, total market surplus is 6. So complete network
19

structure makes sellers better o when they form coalition: the total social surplus increases
from 6 to 9 with the increase in seller's surplus from 3z to 2 + 7z and change in buyer's surplus
from 6 − 3z to 8 − 7z .

6

Conclusion and possible extensions

The main purpose of this paper is to analyze how the cooperation between sellers may eliminate
the barriers created by a network structure of the market. The collusive behavior between
sellers is modeled as a link sharing process. Sellers are allowed to trade with each other prior
to the bargaining stage. When network is built, sellers and buyers bargain for the product.
The question that was raised is how the information sharing (access sharing) aects the network
structure of the market. Surprisingly, in the general heterogeneous model, sharing always leads
to a maximum increase in eciency when an equilibrium exists. The more interesting question
is how the market surplus will be reallocated from buyers to sellers (or from sellers to buyers).
For the simplied version of the model it is shown that when number of buyers in the network is
large, sellers extract full benets from trade by matching non-trading agents with each other as
well as increasing seller's bargaining power. When number of sellers and number of buyers are
relatively equal, no equilibrium exists. Alternatively, when market has a number of new entrants
exceeding number of buyers, existence of equilibria for any type of network may be guaranteed
by the bargaining privileges of sellers over buyers and a low xed cost level. Exactly for these
specication of parameters, the bargaining outcome will be most equal: monopolized sellers will
sacrice their bargaining power to get a share of benets from the additional product being sold.
The special case of the homogeneous model is considered, which we refer to as a business
expansion model for the rm. Additional to the equilibrium where the rm earns no prot from
business expansion, another, non-trivial, equilibrium exists. Firm collects payments from the
tree of intermediaries. It is shown that the position of seller in the tree as well as the rent
depend on the guarantee that rm is willing to provide.
Further extension of the model may be in relaxing the main assumptions, such as linearity
of trader's preferences and unit demand. The future work also includes comparison of the
models with access sharing and access selling. Finally, cooperative behavior may be extended
to aggressive collusive behavior, such as sharing nanced by a group of rms. This network
formation rule could eliminate positive externality problem and increase prots of the supplier.
The main theoretical contribution of this paper is an extension of the pairwise Nash equilibrium in the network formation games with transfers. The following modication of the classic
approach has been made: to form a link two sides sign a contract, which may be dened as a
function, rather than a number. The consistency of two proposals should be present in order
for contract to be signed. The pairwise stability with transfers is applied to a multiple-stage
game. We think that a more general theoretical denition of the dynamic pairwise stable equilibrium with contracts should be provided in the future for general network formation games. It
is commonly the case in reality that a business connection between two agents is formed based
on the contract contingent on the future state of the world. So theory built as an extension of
this paper should become a solid base for the future research.
The paper also leaves room for the policy implications, which may include taxation of the
sharing activity as well as restrictions on the level of xed cost. A question that can be asked in
the future is the existence of an ecient stable equilibrium when the policy is implemented.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
If there are more than two sellers in a sub-network of type Ge and N > 1 subnetworks of type
Ge exist, the intuition is similar to the example in the subsection 6.1. With cooperation among
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sellers, there is exactly one seller in each sub-network, paying for the access, the rest of sellers
free ride. Without loss of generality, we say that the set of sellers paying for the access is
(s2 ∈ Ge2 , ...., sk ∈ Gek , ..., sN ∈ GeN ) (see Figure 8 for an example).
Now suppose that at least two sellers (sk and sk+1 ) buy access directly from seller s1 . Then
one of them (sk+1 ) has always incentives to deviate and get access from sk at a lower price
unless price is zero. The only case when sellers are indierent between breaching and keeping
the contract is when all sellers connected to s1 are transferring zero. In this case it becomes
costless to get an access from s1 , so all agreements that Ge sellers form with each other can only
be of a zero transfer. As a result of link sharing with zero transfers, all Ge sellers upgrade their
type to Gb . The mapping of sharing contracts is not so important in this case; more than that,
any network of pairwise agreements formed by sellers (s1 , s2 , ..., sN ) will support this equilibrium.
To nd equilibria with non-zero transfers, we start with only one seller buying an access from
s1 (for example in Figure 8 s2 ∈ Ge2 transfers t2,1 > 0)17 . Suppose also that there is another
seller s3 getting access through s2 . If s2 can cover the cost of a new link and stay protable in
the deal with 0 ≤ t2,1 ≤ 1 − z , he accepts any type of agreement t3,2 ≥ 0 from s3 (use Figure
8 for the graphical representation). Seller s1 also accepts any agreement terms from s3 , because
it does not aect the solvency of his current partner s2 . We know that necessary condition for
stability is s3 getting access through s2 , so to eliminate strong incentives of s3 to deviate to the
contract with s1 , we require t3,2 = 0. By induction we know that once one seller gets an access
at zero price, others also pay zero for the access.
If (1 − z) < t2,1 ≤ 1, at least two sellers needed for s1 to share. Nevertheless, in this case
equilibrium does not exist, because s3 can always breach and cooperate with s1 at a lower price.
Seller s1 is willing to hold up, because t2,1 will be repaid anyway from the funds of s1 . Thus for
stability we require at least t2,1 > 1. When t2,1 > 1 and the transfers of two sellers is enough to
cover t2,1 , they have no incentives to breach if net transfer is less than 1 − z . Sellers s1 and s3
do not hold up on s2 if net transfer ∆t2 is greater than the xed cost B2,1 . Then the necessary
condition for the equilibrium with positive transfers is

B2,1 ≤ 1 − z,
and we require

B2,1 < ∆t2 ≤ 1 − z, where ∆t2 = t2,1 − t3,2

∆t3 ≤ 1 − z, where ∆t3 = t3,1
If there are at least three subnetworks of type Ge and t3,1 ≤ 1 − z , the leading seller of
subnetwork Ge can bargain with s2 and s3 for the access and nally decrease the transfer to
t4,i = 0. The rest of sellers get access for free.
We generalize the case for t2,1 > 1 − z , with intermediary sk getting an access from sk−1
and transferring tk,k−1 to show that equilibria with more than two stages of intermediaries are
possible. Being a member of the tree, each seller sk transfers at least the amount that was
17

The upper index m of the transfer variable tm
k.l is omitted for simplicity.

23

0 ≤ t2,1 ≤ 1 − z

t3,2=0

S3

S2

S1

B1

B2

B4

B3

Gb

B4

B3
Ge

Ge

Figure 8: Network decomposition of emerged network G0 .
transferred to him. So there is also no player in the tree who gets a direct prot from reselling.
Otherwise, seller sk+1 will jump over sk and cooperate with sk−1 and other sellers on the same
tree level at a price lower then it is paid to sk . Thus an equilibrium set of transfers needs to
satisfy

0 ≤ tk,k−1 −

N
X

tl,k ≤ 1 − z for k = 2, ..., K

l=1

t2,1 = −t1,2
P
For simplicity we denote the net transfer of seller sk as ∆tk = tk,k−1 − N
l=1 tl,k . Then the
condition above is equivalent to 0 ≤ ∆tk ≤ 1 − z . It is obvious that for the equilibrium with
the tree of K sellers, the total prot of agent s1 cannot exceed K(1 − z) but it can be less, which
means that the same prot for seller s1 may be provided by a dierent number of intermediaries.
S1
t2,1 > 1

S2
S3

........................................................................

Sk-1
Sk
Sk+1
........................................................................

Figure 9: Formation of a chain of resellers
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To control for a hold up problem in the contracts with non-zero transfers, we start with the
conditions on transfers to eliminate incentives for sellers sk−1 and sk+1 to trade apart from sk
with transfer t̂t+1,t−1 . When a hold up problem arises, seller sk−1 undercuts sk but nevertheless
keeps the contract with sk open (see Figure 9 for the tree of intermediaries). Additional to
the transfer t̂t+1,t−1 from sk+1 , seller sk−1 gets a full payment from sk if sk is able to repay it,
otherwise he gets the amount of deposit Bk,k−1 in case of default. We may say that sk−1 gets the
following payment from sk

xk,k−1

(
tk,k−1, if
=
Bk,k−1 , if

PN
PN
tl,k + ∆tk
l=1 tl,k − tk+1,k + 1 ≥ tk,k−1 =
Pl=1
PN
N
l=1 tl,k + ∆tk
l=1 tl,k − tk+1,k + 1 < tk,k−1 =

which can be simplied to

xk,k−1

(
tk,k−1, if
=
Bk,k−1 , if

∆tk ≤ 1 − tk+1,k
∆tk > 1 − tk+1,k

Then seller sk−1 has incentives to deviate from the equilibrium if and only if

t̂t+1,t−1 + xk,k−1 ≥ tk,k−1
if

Seller sk+1 has incentives to breach the contract with sk and cooperate with sk−1 if and only

t̂t+1,t−1 ≤ tk+1,k
.

Thus we can say that transfers are pairwise stable when

tk.k−1 − xk,k−1 ≥ tk+1,k
or using the denition of xk,k−1 we can formulate the condition on pairwise stability in terms
of transfers (tk,k−1 , tk+1,k ) and net transfer ∆tk :
if ∆tk + tk+1,k ≤ 1 then tk+1,k ≤ 0
if ∆tk + tk+1,k > 1 then tk,k−1 − tk+1,k ≥ Bk,k−1

0 ≤ ∆tk ≤ 1 − z
.

From the conditions above, it immediately follows that tk+1,k ≥ z unless tk+1,k = 0. If layer
k + 1 is the last layer paying non-zero transfer, then

z < tk+1,k = ∆tk+1 ≤ 1 − z
So condition z <

1
2

is a necessary condition for the non-zero transfer equilibrium to exist. I
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Proof of Proposition 2
J

Suppose without loss of generality s1 ∈ Gb (G0 ), s2 ∈ Ge (G0 ) and s3 ∈ Gs (G0 ) and network
G' is formed in the stable equilibrium, such that s1 ∈ Gb (G0 ). Then the following statements
are true.
If s1 ∈ Gb (G0 ) and s2 ∈ Ge (G0 ) then there exist a pairwise deviation of (s1 , s2 ) such that
s1 ∈ Gb , s2 ∈ Gb . In the same way if s1 ∈ Gb (G0 ) and s3 ∈ Ge (G0 ) then there exist a pairwise
deviation of (s1 , s3 ) such that s1 ∈ Gb , s3 ∈ Gb . So to eliminate similar deviations we consider
only stable equilibria with networks of types Gs and Gb .
Suppose s1 ∈ Gb (G0 ) and s3 ∈ Gs (G0 ) and N b (Gb , G0 ) − N s (Gb , G0 ) ≥ 2, then there exist a
pairwise deviation of (s1 , s3 ) such that s1 ∈ Gb , s3 ∈ Gb .
Supposes1 ∈ Gb (G0 ) and s3 ∈ Gs (G0 ) and N b (Gb , G0 ) − N s (Gb , G0 ) = 1 , then there exist a
pairwise deviation of (s1 , s3 ) such that s1 ∈ Ge , s3 ∈ Ge if and only if there exists transfer t3,1
such that

t3,1 ≤ z and z + t3,1 ≥
2z − 1 +

P

P

l,l6=2 (tl,1

l,l6=2 (tl,1

− B1,l )

− B1,l ) ≤ 0

If seller s1 has incentives to deviate to (s1 , s3 ) then s2 also has incentives to deviate to (s2 , s3 )
because we know that s2 ∈ Gb ∈ G0 . The transfer that s2 demands is lower transfer than the
transfer that s1 demands, because he does not need to pay a xed cost level and he gets access
for free. So if t3,2 ≥ 1 − z , there will be a deviation from the equilibrium. We may conclude that
under condition z ≥ 12 (1 − z ≤ z) equilibrium characterized by s1 ∈ Gb (G0 ) and s3 ∈ Gs (G0 ) and
N b (Gb , G0 ) − N s (Gb , G0 ) = 1 is not stable.
Suppose that s1 ∈ Gb (G0 ) and s3P
∈ Gs (G0 )) and N b (Gb , G0 ) − N s (Gb , G0 ) = 1 and z ≤ 12 , so
in inequality above 2z − 1 ≤ 0 and l,l6=2 (tl,1 − B1,l ) ≤ 0 by denition. Then there is always a
deviation from the equilibrium.
1
s
0
b
b
0
s
b
0
Suppose that s1 ∈ Gb (G0 ) and sP
3 ∈ G (G )and N (G , G ) − N (G , G ) = 1 and z ≥ 2 , so
in inequality above 2z − 1 ≤ 0 and l,l6=2 (tl,1 − B1,l ) ≤ 0 by denition. Then there is always a
deviation from the equilibrium.
So we can say that equilibrium with N b (Gb , G0 ) − N s (Gb , G0 ) = 1 does not exist.
Given the restrictions above we determine the stable set as a set being externally and internally stable.
Now we suppose that s1 ∈ Gb (G0 ) , s2 ∈ Ge (G0 ) and s3 ∈ Gs (G0 ) and network G' is formed
as a part of stable equilibrium, such thats1 ∈ Ge (G0 ). Sellers of type Gs (G0 ) buy access from
sellers of type Gb (G0 ) . Seller of type G^{e} could resell the access from Gb , but they would
have no prot. Then there is no pairwise deviation from the equilibrium network G' and transfers
{ti,j }i,j if there are incentives to breach the contract (1 − B3,1 ≤ z + t3,1 andt3,1 ≤ z ). Obviously,
there exist a set of transfers like this if and only if z ≥ 1 − z − B3,1 z ≥ 12 (1 − B3,1 ) . If number of
sellers in the network is equal to the number of buyers, there is no competition for the sharing
agreement. If there are more sellers than buyers, then each seller s3 ∈ Gs (G0 ) transfers exactly
t3,1 = 1 − z − B3,1 to a seller s1 ∈ Gb (G0 ). I
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Proof of Proposition 5
Ja) Suppose the rst statement is not the case and there exists a pair of buyers b1 ∈ NN ∩ B
and b2 ∈ NP ∩ B such that v(b1 ) > v(b2 ). Assume buyer b2 serves as the best alternative oer to
some seller s2 . Buyer b1 has no impact on the equilibrium prices, but it is connected to a seller
s1 . Then there is always a protable pairwise deviation of coalition (s1 , s2 ), since sharing access
to b1 with s2 does not aect the bargaining power of any seller besides s2 , and it allows s2 to
increase his payo by charging a higher price. It proves the rst statement.
b) Suppose the second statement is not valid for two buyers b1 ∈ NP ∩ B and b2 ∈ NA ∩ B
such that v(b1 ) > v(b2 ). Buyer b2 trades with s2 and buyer b1 does not trade with anyone, but
provides an alternative oer to seller s1 . Since b1 does not trade with anyone, seller s1 gets at
least the payo
a.o.(s1 ) = v(b1 ) − v(s1 ),
which we call alternative oer. According to the paper of Elliot (2010), the payo of seller
s1 trading with buyer bi is a function

Vs1 = a.o.(s1 ) + z(v(bi ) − v(s1 ) − a.o.(s1 ) − a.o.(bi ))
...

After s1 and s2 share the access to b1 , seller s1 may change the alternative buyer, but his
minimum payo will still exceed the payo that s1 could get if traded with b1 :

a.o.(s
ˆ 1 ) ≥ v(b2 ) − v(s1 ) − a.o.(b2 ).

V̂s1 = a.o.(s
ˆ 1 ) + z(v(bi ) − v(s1 ) − a.o.(s
ˆ 1 ) − a.o.(bi )).
Additional surplus to seller s1 then becomes

ˆ
V̂s1 − Vs1 = (1 − z)(a.o.(s
1 ) − a.o.(s1 )) = (1 − z)(v(b2 ) − v(b1 ) − a.o.(b2 )).
Following the same logic the payos of s2 before and after sharing can be found as

Vs2 = p(s2 , b2 ) − v(s2 )

V̂s2 = p̂(s2 , b2 ) − v(s2 )

p̂(s2 , b2 ) = zp(s2 , b2 ) + (1 − z)v(b1 ),
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and a corresponding increase in utility is

V̂s2 − Vs2 = (z − 1)p(s2 , b2 ) + (1 − z)v(b1 ) = (1 − z)(v(b1 ) − p(s2 , b2 ))
.

Then the total pairwise surplus from the deviation is

V̂s2 − Vs2 + V̂s1 − Vs1 ≥ (1 − z)(v(b2 ) − p(s2 , b2 ) − a.o.(b2 )) = (1 − z)(Vb2 − a.o.(b2 )) ≥ 0
So there is always a protable pairwise deviation, which contradicts the fact that equilibrium
strategies are stable. We just proved that only buyers with the highest values will trade.
c) Suppose the statement is false, then there exist s1 ∈ NA and s2 ∈ NP ∪ NN , such that
for trading seller it is more costly to produce a good v(s1 ) > v(s2 ). We are going to show
that it is always pairwise protable for seller s1 to share access to his trading partner and to
his alternative buyer. Two sellers will always negotiate on the transfer t1,2 if the total pairwise
benet is positive, so we just need to show that there exist bargaining actions that provides a
higher utility level than p1,1 − v(s1 ). It is the case when seller s2 gets access to all connections
of seller s1 for the transfer t1,2 = p2,1 − v(s1 ) − ε. Seller s2 bids the same price that s1 proposed
in the no-sharing setup and gets payo of p1,1 − v(s2 ). Playing cooperatively, seller s1 abstains
from any bids and gets payo of zero. Total pairwise payo increases by v(s1 ) − v(s2 ) > 0, the
payo of s2 increases by ε and the payo of s1 increases by v(s1 ) − v(s2 ) − ε . So we proved the
existence of a pairwise deviation.I
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